Packet-Hiding Methods
for Preventing Selective Jamming Attacks
ABSTRACT:
The open nature of the wireless medium
leaves it vulnerable to intentional interference attacks, typically referred to
as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmissions can be
used as a launch pad for mounting Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless
networks. Typically, jamming has been addressed under an external threat model.
However, adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol specifications and
network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to
detect and counter. In this work, we address the problem of selective jamming
attacks in wireless networks. In these attacks, the adversary is active only for
a short period of time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We
illustrate the advantages of selective jamming in terms of network performance
degradation and adversary effort by presenting two case studies; a selective
attack on TCP and one on routing. We show that selective jamming attacks can be
launched by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer.
To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real-time
packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer
attributes. We analyze the security of our methods and evaluate their
computational and communication overhead.
AIM:
To
show that selective jamming attacks can be launched by performing real time
packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks develop a
schemes that prevent real-time packet classification by combining cryptographic
primitives with physical layer attributes.
SYNOPSIS:
To
address the problem of jamming under an internal threat model and consider a
sophisticated adversary who is aware of network secrets and the implementation details
of network protocols at any layer in the network stack. The adversary exploits
his internal knowledge for launching selective jamming attacks in which
specific messages of high importance are targeted. For example, a jammer can
target route-request/route-reply messages at the routing layer to prevent route
discovery, or target TCP acknowledgments in a TCP session to severely degrade
the throughput of an end-to-end flow.
The
jammer may decode the first few bits of a packet for recovering useful packet
identifiers such as packet type, source and destination address. After
classification, the adversary must induce a sufficient number of bit errors so
that the packet cannot be recovered at the receiver.
ARCHITECTURE:
EXISTING SYSTEM:
Conventional
anti-jamming techniques rely extensively on spread-spectrum (SS) communications
or some form of jamming evasion (e.g., slow frequency hopping, or spatial retreats).
SS techniques provide bit-level protection by spreading bits according to a
secret pseudo-noise (PN) code, known only to the communicating parties. These methods
can only protect wireless transmissions under the external threat model.
DISADVANTAGES OF
EXISITNG SYTEM:
·
Broadcast communications are
particularly vulnerable under an internal threat model because all intended
receivers must be aware of the secrets used to protect transmissions.
·
Hence, the compromise of a single
receiver is sufficient to reveal relevant cryptographic information.
PROPOSED SYSTEM:
An
intuitive solution to selective jamming would be the encryption of transmitted
packets (including headers) with a static key. However, for broadcast
communications, this static decryption key must be known to all intended receivers
and hence, is susceptible to compromise. Moreover, even if the encryption key
of a hiding scheme were to remain secret, the static portions of a transmitted packet
could potentially lead to packet classification.
ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED
SYSTEM:
- ü Relatively easy to actualize by exploiting knowledge of network protocols and cryptographic primitives extracted from compromised nodes
- ü Our findings indicate that selective jamming attacks lead to a DoS with very low effort on behalf of the jammer.
- ü Achieve strong security properties
MODULES:
- ü Real Time Packet Classification
- ü A Strong Hiding Commitment Scheme
- ü Cryptographic Puzzle Hiding Scheme
- ü Hiding based on All-Or-Nothing Transformations
MODULES DESCRIPTION:
Real Time Packet Classification:
At
the Physical layer, a packet m is encoded, interleaved, and modulated before it
is transmitted over the wireless channel. At the receiver, the signal is
demodulated, deinterleaved and decoded to recover the original packet m. Nodes
A and B communicate via a wireless link. Within the communication range of both
A and B there is a jamming node J. When A transmits a packet m to B, node J
classifies m by receiving only the first few bytes of m. J then corrupts m beyond
recovery by interfering with its reception at B.
A
Strong Hiding Commitment Scheme
A
strong hiding commitment scheme (SHCS), which is based on symmetric
cryptography. Assume that the sender has a packet for Receiver. First, S
constructs commit( message ) the commitment function is an off-the-shelf symmetric encryption algorithm
is a publicly known permutation, and k
is a randomly selected key of some desired key length s (the length of k
is a security parameter). Upon reception of d, any receiver R computes.
Cryptographic
Puzzle Hiding Scheme
A
sender S have a packet m for transmission. The sender selects a random key k ,
of a desired length. S generates a puzzle (key, time), where puzzle() denotes
the puzzle generator function, and tp denotes the time required for the
solution of the puzzle. Parameter is measured in units of time, and it is
directly dependent on the assumed computational capability of the adversary,
denoted by N and measured in computational operations per second. After
generating the puzzle P, the sender broadcasts (C, P). At the receiver side,
any receiver R solves the received puzzle to recover key and then computes.
Hiding
based on All-Or-Nothing Transformations
The
packets are pre-processed by an AONT before transmission but remain
unencrypted. The jammer cannot perform packet classification until all
pseudo-messages
corresponding
to the original packet have been received and the inverse transformation has
been applied. Packet m is partitioned to a set of x input blocks m = {m1,
m2,m3….}, which serve as an input to an The set of pseudo-messages m = {m1,
m2,m3,…..} is transmitted over the wireless medium.
CONCLUSION:
An
internal adversary model in which the jammer is part of the network under attack,
thus being aware of the protocol specifications and shared network secrets. We
showed that the jammer can classify transmitted packets in real time by
decoding the first few symbols of an ongoing transmission. We evaluated the
impact of selective jamming attacks on network protocols such as TCP and
routing. Our findings show that a selective jammer can significantly impact
performance with very low effort. We developed three schemes that transform a
selective jammer to a random one by preventing real-time packet classification.
REFERENCE:
Alejandro Proan˜o and Loukas Lazos, “Packet-Hiding
Methods for Preventing Selective Jamming Attacks” IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, VOL. 9, NO. 1,
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2012.
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