Design and
Implementation of TARF:
A Trust-Aware Routing
Framework for WSNs
ABSTRACT:
The multihop routing in wireless sensor
networks (WSNs) offers little protection against identity deception through
replaying routing information. An adversary can exploit this defect to launch
various harmful or even devastating attacks against the routing protocols,
including sinkhole attacks, wormhole attacks, and Sybil attacks. The situation
is further aggravated by mobile and harsh network conditions. Traditional
cryptographic techniques or efforts at developing trust-aware routing protocols
do not effectively address this severe problem. To secure the WSNs against
adversaries misdirecting the multihop routing, we have designed and implemented
TARF, a robust trust-aware routing framework for dynamic WSNs. Without tight
time synchronization or known geographic information, TARF provides trustworthy
and energy-efficient route. Most importantly, TARF proves effective against
those harmful attacks developed out of identity deception; the resilience of
TARF is verified through extensive evaluation with both simulation and
empirical experiments on large-scale WSNs under various scenarios including
mobile and RF-shielding network conditions. Further, we have implemented a
low-overhead TARF module in TinyOS; as demonstrated, this implementation can be
incorporated into existing routing protocols with the least effort. Based on
TARF, we also demonstrated a proof-of-concept mobile target detection application
that functions well against an antidetection mechanism.
AIM
To focus on the kind of
attacks in which adversaries misdirect network traffic by identity deception
through replaying routing information. Based on identity deception, the
adversary is capable of launching harmful and hard-to-detect attacks against
routing, such as selective forwarding, wormhole attacks, sinkhole attacks and
Sybil attacks.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) are ideal candidates for applications to report detected events of
interest, such as military surveillance and forest fire monitoring. A WSN
comprises battery-powered senor nodes with extremely limited processing
capabilities. With a narrow radio communication range, a sensor node wirelessly
sends messages to a base station via a multi-hop path. However, the multi-hop
routing of WSNs often becomes the target of malicious attacks. An attacker may
tamper nodes physically, create traffic collision with seemingly valid
transmission, drop or misdirect messages in routes, or jam the communication
channel by creating radio interference.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
As a harmful and
easy-to-implement type of attack, a malicious node simply replays all the
outgoing routing packets from a valid node to forge the latter node’s identity;
the malicious node then uses this forged identity to participate in the network
routing, thus disrupting the network traffic. Even if this malicious node
cannot directly overhear the valid node’s wireless transmission, it can collude
with other malicious nodes to receive those routing packets, which is known as
a wormhole attack.
A node in a WSN relies solely
on the packets received to know about the sender’s identity, replaying routing
packets allows the malicious node to forge the identity of this valid node.
After “stealing” that valid identity, this malicious node is able to misdirect
the network traffic. It may drop packets received, forward packets to another
node not supposed to be in the routing path, or form a transmission loop
through which packets are passed among a few malicious nodes infinitely.
Sinkhole attacks can be
launched after stealing a valid identity, in which a malicious node may claim
itself to be a base station through replaying all the packets from a real base
station. Such a fake base station could lure more than half the traffic,
creating a “black hole.” This same technique can be employed to conduct another
strong form of attack Sybil attack: through replaying the routing information
of multiple legitimate nodes, an attacker may present multiple identities to
the network. A valid node, if compromised, can also launch all these attacks.
PROBLEM SOLUTION
v To protect WSNs from the harmful attacks exploiting the replay of
routing information, designed and implemented a robust trust-aware routing
framework, TARF, to secure routing solutions in wireless sensor networks.
v Based on the unique characteristics of resource-constrained WSNs,
the design of TARF centers on trustworthiness and energy efficiency.
v TARF requires neither tight time synchronization nor known
geographic information.
v TARF proves resilient under various attacks exploiting the replay
of routing information, which is not achieved by previous security protocols.
v Even under strong attacks such as sinkhole attacks, wormhole
attacks as well as Sybil attacks, and hostile mobile network condition, TARF
demonstrates steady improvement in network performance.
v Implemented a ready-to-use TARF module with low overhead, which as
demonstrated can be integrated into existing routing protocols with ease.
EXISTING
SYSTEM:
In the existing system, the multihop
routing of WSNs often becomes the target of malicious attacks. An attacker may tamper
nodes physically, create traffic collision with seemingly valid transmission,
drop or misdirect messages in routes, or jam the communication channel by
creating radio interference.
Most existing routing protocols for WSNs
either assume the honesty of nodes and focus on energy efficiency, or attempt
to exclude unauthorized participation by encrypting data and authenticating
packets. Examples of these encryption and authentication schemes for WSNs
include TinySec, Spins, TinyPK, and TinyECC.
In addition to the cryptographic
methods, trust and reputation management has been employed in generic ad hoc
networks and WSNs to secure routing protocols. Basically, a system of trust and
reputation management assigns each node a trust value according to its past
performance in routing. Then such trust values are used to help decide a secure
and efficient route. However, the proposed trust and reputation management
systems for generic ad hoc networks target only relatively powerful hardware
platforms such as laptops and smartphones.
DISADVANTAGES
OF EXISTING SYSTEM:
v Various types of attacks are avoided
v Trust and reputation management systems cannot be applied to WSNs
due to the excessive overhead for resource-constrained sensor nodes powered by
batteries.
PROPOSED
SYSTEM:
In the proposed system , to secure the
WSNs against adversaries misdirecting the multihop routing, we have designed
and implemented TARF, a robust trust-aware routing framework for dynamic WSNs.
To protect WSNs from the
harmful attacks exploiting the replay of routing information, TARF, a robust
trust-aware routing framework is designed, to secure routing solutions in
wireless sensor networks.
TARF can be developed into a
complete and independent routing protocol, the purpose is to allow existing
routing protocols to incorporate our implementation of TARF with the least
effort and thus producing a secure and efficient fully-functional protocol.
ADVANTAGES
OF PROPOSED SYSTEM:
v Based on the unique characteristics of resource-constrained WSNs,
the design of TARF centers on trustworthiness and energy efficiency.
v TARF requires neither tight time synchronization nor known
geographic information.
v TARF proves resilient under various attacks exploiting the replay
of routing information, which is not achieved by previous security protocols.
v Even under strong attacks such as sinkhole attacks, wormhole
attacks as well as Sybil attacks, and hostile mobile network condition, TARF
demonstrates steady improvement in network performance.
v TARF module proves low overhead.
MODULES:
v Node
Initialization
v Route
Selection
v Energy
Watcher
v Trust
Manager
MODULES DESCRIPTION:
Node
Initialization
In this module, We design a wireless sensor network, with base
station and other sensor nodes. For a node N, a neighbor (neighboring node) of
N is a node that is reachable from N with one-hop wireless transmission.
Route
Selection
For a TARF-enabled node N to route a data packet to the base
station, N only needs to decide to which neighboring node it should forward the
data packet considering both the trustworthiness and the energy efficiency.
Once the data packet is forwarded to that next-hop node, the remaining task to deliver
the data to the base station is fully delegated to it, and N is totally unaware
of what routing decision its next-hop node makes. N maintains a neighborhood
table with trust level values and energy cost values for certain known
neighbors.
Energy
watcher
For a node N, the energy cost of a neighbor is the average energy
cost to successfully deliver a unitsized data packet with this neighbor as its
next-hop node, from N to the base station. That energy cost is denoted as E
Trust
Manager
For a node N, the trust level of a neighbor is a decimal number in
[0, 1], representing N’s opinion of that neighbor’s level of trustworthiness.
Specifically, the trust level of the neighbor is N’s estimation of the
probability that this neighbor correctly delivers data received to the base
station. That trust level is denoted as T.
SYSTEM
REQUIREMENTS:
HARDWARE
REQUIREMENTS:
•
System : Pentium IV 2.4 GHz.
•
Hard
Disk : 40 GB.
•
Floppy
Drive : 1.44 Mb.
•
Monitor : 15 VGA Colour.
•
Mouse : Logitech.
•
Ram : 512 Mb.
SOFTWARE
REQUIREMENTS:
•
Operating system : - Windows XP.
•
Coding Language : JAVA
REFERENCE:
Guoxing Zhan, Weisong Shi, and Julia
Deng, “Design and Implementation of TARF: A Trust-Aware Routing Framework for
WSNs”, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE
AND SECURE COMPUTING, VOL. 9, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2012.
